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This paper analyzes the relationship between mean income and the income of the rich. 
Our methodology closely follows that of Dollar and Kraay (2002), but instead of 
looking at the bottom of the distribution, we analyze the top. We use panel data from 
the World Top Incomes database, which collects top income data from several 
countries using tax returns as the raw source. We define the “rich” as earners in the top 
10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent of the income distribution. We 
find that economic growth is good for the rich in the sense that the mean income of the 
top decile of the distribution grows in the same proportion as that of the whole 
population. However, we also find that the income of earners in the top percentile of 
the distribution and above grows in an even larger proportion than average income:  
that is, economic growth is really good for the really rich. We also find that during 
economic downturns, the average income of top earners responds proportionally less 
to changes in mean income than during economic expansions. Our results are robust to 
different sample specifications. 
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In recent years there has been growing concern about the rising inequality said to be driven 
by increasing gains in the top brackets of the income distribution. This concern is evident in the 
political and social sphere, notably in public demonstrations in some countries against rising 
incomes at the top (e.g., the Occupy Wall Street movement, with its slogan of “We are the 99 
percent” slogan). Such concern is also found in the academic sphere, as expressed, for example, by 
Alvaredo et al. (2013, p. 3):  “For three decades, the debate about rising income inequality in the 
United States has centered on the dispersion of wages and the increased premium for 
skilled/educated workers […]. In recent years, however, there has been a growing realization that 
most of the action has been at the very top.” And Emmanuel Saez (2012, p. 4) writes:  “From 2009 
to 2010, average real income per family grew by 2.3% but the gains were very uneven. Top 1% 
incomes grew by 11.6% while bottom 99% incomes grew only by 0.2%. Hence, the top 1% 
captured 93% of the income gains in the first year of recovery. Such an uneven recovery can 
possibly explain the recent public demonstrations against inequality.”  
In this paper, we examine whether there is a relationship between increasing economic 
gains at the top of the income distribution and overall economic growth across countries and time. 
Our title makes allusion to Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) “Growth Is Good for the Poor.” We use their 
methodology to investigate whether there is a systematic cross-country pattern that relates economic 
gains in a specific segment of the income distribution to economic growth. However, instead of 
looking at incomes of the poor, we focus our attention on the other extreme of the distribution:  the 
“rich” and the “very rich.” 
By looking at the top of the distribution, our work has several advantages over that of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002). The first is greater precision:  instead of just looking at the bottom 20 
percent or 40 percent, as do Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay (2013), we 
inspect the top of the income distribution in much finer detail. We focus on four groups within the 
top decile of the distribution:  the top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners. 
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The second advantage is greater reliability of data sources. Our main data source is the World Top 
Incomes (WTI) database, which compiles data at the top of the income distribution using tax returns 
as the raw source. This data source allows greater cross-country comparability than household 
surveys, which are the source of data for the bottom of the distribution.
1
  
We use panel data from 1980 to 2011, encompassing 23 countries representing 51.2 percent 
of total world population and 72.1 percent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to investigate 
what happens to incomes at the top with the growth of income per capita. This work can be seen as 
complementary to that of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013), who found, as their title 
suggests, that growth is good for the poor in the sense that when average income grows, their 
income grows in the same proportion. Instead of examining the income of the poor, we regress top 
incomes (top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent) with respect to GDP per capita.  
There have been few previous attempts to systematically study how economic growth 
relates to income of the rich in a cross-country context. Using data from the WTI database, 
Andrews, Jencks, and Leigh (2011) analyze the effect of income shares of top earners (top 10 and 1 
percent) on economic growth; they find that, in general, shares of top earners are not correlated with 
economic growth. However, our approach aims to examine the gains that top earners take from 
economic growth; this, to our knowledge, is the first attempt to do so in a systematic manner. Their 
work uses only the top 10 and 1 percent shares, while our work also analyzes the effect of growth 
on very top incomes (top 0.1 and 0.01 percent shares). They also restrict their study to 12 countries 
and their sample ends in 2000, while our sample includes 23 countries and covers the period from 
1980 to 2011. 
Our findings, as our title suggests, indicate that growth is good for the rich:  when average 
income grows, income in the top decile of the distribution grows in the same proportion. However, 
our findings also indicate that growth is really good for the really rich:  when average income 
grows, income in the top percentile and above grows in an even larger proportion. These results are 
                                                          
1
 We describe our data sources in more detail in Section 3.1. 
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robust to different specifications. We perform robustness tests using different country samples and 
time observations in our dataset. We always find the same pattern:   the income of the richest grows 
proportionally more than that of their less rich counterparts, although in some specifications the 
standard errors are relatively large due to smaller samples. We also find that during periods of 
economic downturn, the income of the rich responds less than during economic expansions. In other 
words, the pattern of income growth for the rich is asymmetric:  in good times the very rich increase 
their income in greater proportion than economic growth, but in bad times their income decreases 
by approximately the same proportion as overall per capita income.  
Our work is motivated by the importance of studying the income dynamics of the rich. 
Atkinson (2007) offers three reasons why we should be interested in examining the rich:  their 
command over resources, their command over people, and their global significance. Whether or not 
the reader agrees with these reasons, top earners undeniably exert a larger influence on national and 
international political and economic decisions than other segments of the population. Since their 
decisions have a large influence on policy and on the economy, it is important to analyze their 
economic interaction with the rest of the population. We hope that our work contributes to this 
discussion. 
The work proceeds as follows:  In Section 2 we conduct a brief review of the literature on 
which we base our research. In Section 3 we describe our data sources, the information, and the 
methodology we use in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the main results and several 
robustness tests. Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We base our research on two different branches of the literature. The first, described as 
“pro-poor growth,” aims to investigate the relationship between economic growth and the earnings 
of the bottom part of the income distribution. We base our analysis in particular on the efforts of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) to describe the relationship between the income of the poor and the 
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average income of the population as a whole. Defining poor individuals as earners in the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, they find, as their title suggests, that economic growth is good 
for the poor:  on average, when mean income grows, income of the poor grows proportionally.
2
 
They find no empirical evidence that particular economic policies or other determinants of overall 
economic growth are specifically correlated to the income growth of poor individuals. Their 
findings are limited to stating that growth is good for the poor chiefly because their total share of 
income does not change with economic growth:  if average income increases, the income of poor 
individuals increases in the same proportion. They perform cross-country regression analysis to 
arrive at that conclusion, and their findings hold across geographic regions and periods of economic 
crisis. They use GDP per capita to measure overall income and data compiled in household surveys 
to measure the income of poor individuals.
3
 Their dataset consists of 953 observations that cover 
137 countries from 1950 to 1990. 
Dollar et al. (2013) have recently updated the work of Dollar and Kraay (2002). Their 
dataset consists of 963 observations covering 151 countries during the period 1967-2011. They 
extend the definition of poor earners to include not only those in the bottom 20 percent of the 
income distribution, but also those in the bottom 40 percent. Their findings remain unchanged:  
income of the poor grows in the same proportion as mean income. This result holds for both the 
bottom 20 and the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. They thus conclude that even in the 
first decade of the 21st century, growth is good for the poor. Like Dollar and Kraay (2002), Dollar 
et al. (2013) were unable to find variables correlated both to overall economic growth and to 
changes in the income share of the poor. 
                                                          
2
 Using methodologies similar to those of Dollar and Kraay (2002), Romer and Gugerty (1997) and Gallup, 
Radelet, and Warner (1998) also find that income of the poor grows in the same proportion as mean income. 
They also conclude that economic growth is an important driver of poverty reduction. 
3
 Their method is to take the share of income earned by the poorest quintile of the population, multiply it by 
mean income, and divide by 0.2. When that information is not available, they use Gini coefficients and 
assume that the income distribution is lognormal to obtain the share of income for the poorest percentile.  
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We cannot use household surveys to obtain the income of top earners, as did Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013), because, as Saez (2001) notes, top earners are undersampled 
by such surveys. We thus need to find a different source to measure this income. This is where we 
draw upon another branch of the literature, one which obtains the incomes of top earners using tax 
returns.  
Piketty (2001) was the first to use tax returns to calculate income shares at the top of the 
distribution,
4
 obtaining homogenous annual series on top incomes in France from 1901 to 1998, 
using income tax, wage tax, and inheritance tax returns.
5
 Several studies calculating top incomes 
from tax return data followed this initial effort. Atkinson (2002) applied Piketty’s methodology to 
obtain income series of top earners in the United Kingdom from 1908 to 2000. Piketty and Saez 
(2003) followed suit, creating a top income series for the United States from 1913 to 2002. Since 
then, several authors have made use of the same methodology, creating internationally comparable 
series for 26 different countries. This work is compiled in Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010), and 
the data has been made public through the World Top Incomes database, which is available online. 
The database is regularly updated and, for many countries, series are available through the year 
2011. 
We should note that the literature on which we base our research has not been free of 
criticism. Lübker, Smith, and Weeks (2002) critique Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) work, observing, 
first, that by construction we should expect an elasticity of income of the poor with respect to 
average income equal to one. They also find a weakness, showing that the findings do not hold for 
                                                          
4
 Before Piketty (2001), other authors had used tax returns to calculate income shares for top earners: Kuznets 
(1953), for example, estimated incomes of top earners in the United States using tax return data, but he did 
not estimate top income shares other than the top 10 percent. Feenberg and Poterba (1993) also calculated 
income shares of top earners from 1951 to 1990 in the United States based on tax returns, describing trends in 
income concentration at the top similar to those found by later authors. See the article by Atkinson, Piketty, 
and Saez (2011) for a general overview of this subject. 
5
 Historical data contained in tax returns has been used for purposes other than estimating incomes of top 
earners. Goolsbee, Hall, and Katz (1999), for example, used such information to calculate taxpayers’ 
responses to changes in the marginal income tax rate in the United States from the 1920s to the 1990s. Piketty 
and Zucman (2013) use tax returns to calculate wealth-income shares in industrialized countries from 1700 to 
2010. There is clearly a trend toward using historical tax-return data to analyze subjects related to public 
finance and income distribution. 
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different sub-samples. A third critique concerns the reliability of their data on poor earners, since 
some observations are expressed before taxes and others after taxes, among other issues.
6
 
It is important to consider the critiques of Lübker et al. (2002), as we follow the very 
methodology they criticize. However, we should also mention Dollar and Kraay’s (2002b) response 
to those critiques. They do not address the point about data inconsistency, but that criticism does not 
apply to our case, since the World Top Incomes database, which we use, has made a considerable 
effort to compare top incomes across different countries (see the dataset in Alvaredo et al., 2013 and 
a general overview in Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011). They do show that the derivation for the a 
priori result for the elasticity is incorrect, and that the samples chosen by Lübker et al. (2002) are 
not statistically valid, as they draw samples on the dependent variable, which will in general bias 
estimates toward zero. In order to avoid this problem, we perform several robustness tests on our 
results.  
There is also criticism of the literature on measuring income of top earners using tax 
returns. Burkhauser, Hahn, and Wilkins (2013), for example, replicate Atkinson and Leigh’s (2007) 
calculations of top incomes in Australia using tax return data. They argue that the rise in income 
accruing to top earners in Australia observed in Atkinson and Leigh’s (2007) work is the result of 
changes in Australian tax law that took place in 1987 and 1988, which treated a larger share of 
company profits as personal income. They construct an alternative series for incomes of top 
Australian earners excluding realized capital gains, and they find smaller increases in top income 
shares.  
An analysis by Burkhauser et al. (2013) shows that estimates using Piketty’s (2001) method 
could be sensitive to changing definitions in the tax law over time. However their estimates do not 
                                                          
6
 A different critique is presented by Foster and Szekely (2008). They argue, among other things, that the 
method used by Dollar and Kray (2002) and others is not coherent in cross-country comparisons, since the 
bottom 20 percent in poor countries is poorer than the bottom 20 percent in rich countries. They propose a 
different method to inspect the relation between growth and income of the poor, one using “generalized 
means,” which give larger weights to earners at the bottom of the distribution. Using this methodology, they 
find that income of the poor increases in a smaller proportion than mean income, although many of their 
estimates are not statistically significant. 
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differ greatly from those found by Atkinson and Leigh (2007), and the trends observed in both 
series are similar. Their findings, moreover, signal a cautionary problem in a particular country, not 
a flaw in the overall methodology. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) recognize that their methodology 
may be affected by particular issues,
7
 and they explain the methods used to correct them. 
Although we recognize the validity of some of this criticism of the literature on which we 
base our work, we do not consider that it fundamentally affects the results and conclusions drawn. 
We believe that the methodologies developed by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and by Piketty (2001) 
provide a strong basis for examination of the relationship between economic growth and changes in 
income of top earners. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
The main source of data for this work is the World Top Incomes database (Alvaredo et al., 
2013), which compiles extensive data on income at the top of the distribution across countries over 
long periods of time. Most countries included in the WTI database are developed, although there are 
also a number of developing countries. There are a total of 26 countries, of which 23 are included in 
our empirical analysis. Although the number of countries covered in the database is not large, those 
covered represent 51.2 percent of total world population and 72.1 percent of world GDP. Therefore, 
we can argue that these countries are large enough to allow us to derive general conclusions on the 
relationship between income and economic growth.
8
 All income in the database is before taxes, and 
all the information is converted into constant 2005 international PPP dollars, using data from the 
Penn World Tables. The raw data for the WTI database is obtained from tax returns, which are 
                                                          
7
 Some of these issues are mentioned where we describe our data sources. 
8
 Countries covered in the World Top Incomes database are Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
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available for some countries from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, coinciding with 
the establishment of progressive income taxes (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007).
9
 
Using the WTI database to examine income distribution dynamics at the top has several 
advantages that other sources of data cannot provide. The most important of these is the very fact 
that the database allows us to examine income dynamics at the top. Other sources of data on income 
distribution are based on household surveys, and these typically undersample top earners. In 
addition, data in the WTI is obtained from the same raw source for all countries, guaranteeing cross-
country comparability. Data obtained from household surveys is often not comparable across 
countries since surveys differ in their methodology and representativeness.
10
 
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) mention several limitations of the WTI data, two of 
which are of concern for our study. The first is that data for some countries is based on individual 
income and for others on family income. We therefore use only data on individual income. The 
second problem is that the series might be biased as a result of tax evasion. Even so, WTI data still 
presents a more reliable picture of income at the top than other sources.
11
 
Several other authors have used the WTI database in studies related to income of the rich. 
Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011) analyze the effects of top earners´ tax rates on their income 
shares before and after taxes. They also analyze the correlation between tax cuts for top earners and 
economic growth. Andrews, Jencks, and Leigh (2011) analyze the effect of income shares of top 
                                                          
9
 Tax return data typically includes average income and number of tax filers for different income branches. 
With this information, Pareto extrapolation techniques can be used to calculate the share of income accruing 
to top earners. This is possible because income distributions closely follow a Pareto distribution. For a more 
detailed explanation of Pareto extrapolation techniques, see Feenberg and Poterba (1993). Of course, these 
techniques also present some methodological problems, such as which total income and population 
information must be used to calculate the share of total income that top earners receive. These and other 
issues are discussed in greater detail by Atkinson and Piketty (2007), who conclude that their calculations are 
nonetheless fairly robust. 
10
 See Dollar and Kraay (2002) for a more detailed discussion of the problems with data on bottom earners in 
cross-country analysis. For a more detailed description of the World Top Incomes database, see Atkinson and 
Piketty (2007). 
11
 In the case of the United States, Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2011) argue that there is little evidence of a 
relationship between a decrease in tax avoidance and a surge in top income.  
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earners on economic growth. To our knowledge, however, our study is the first to analyze the gains 
that top earners take from economic growth in a systematic cross-country manner. 
We are interested in four variables from the database:  average income of top 10 percent, 1 
percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners.
12,13
 With this data, we construct a dataset that covers 
23 different countries.
14,15
 Table 1 shows the number of annual observations of top earners per 
country available in our dataset from 1980 to 2011. In some cases, data in the WTI database goes 
back further than 1980; however, we restrict our sample to the period 1980-2011, since data for 
most countries dates from 1980 onwards, and our aim is to analyze global trends. Data for most 
countries does not cover the entire period, and the number of observations varies according to the 
top earner category under consideration, but we are still able to include a relatively large number of 
observations: 490 for top 10 percent earners, 559 for the top 1 percent, 483 for the top 0.1 percent, 
and 337 for the top 0.01 percent. As shown in Table 1, there is considerable variability in the data 
availabile for each country. At one extreme, Sweden has 32 observations, one for each year in the 
period 1980-2011, for each category of top earner (top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.01 
percent). South Africa, however, has zero observations for the top 10 percent, 13 for the top 1 
                                                          
12
 Series chosen for the analysis performed in this work do not include capital gains because these are 
available for a smaller number of countries. 
13
 Data for average income of top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners in the WTI 
database is expressed in constant local currency units, and base years differ among countries. In order to 
obtain data on top incomes in a comparable international unit, we take a price index for each country from the 
database and use it to transform amounts to 2005 constant prices, and then use the PPP conversion factor in 
the Penn World Tables to transform amounts to international dollars. Data on GDP per capita was obtained 
from the Penn World Tables and is also expressed in constant 2005 international PPP dollars. 
14
 The WTI database covers 26 different countries. We exclude three countries from our analysis: Finland, 
because data for that country does not include top earners for the period under study; the Netherlands,  
because of difficulties in obtaining an appropriate conversion factor from the Dutch guilder to international 
PPP dollars; and Indonesia, because units in the WTI database seem to be incorrectly expressed for that 
country. 
15
 Our dataset is much smaller than that of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013), who include 
more than 100 countries. We inlude only 23, because public information from tax returns is more limited than 
that from household surveys. For the time being, an analysis such as ours cannot be performed for a larger 
number of countries. Nevertheless, the WTI database is constantly expanding, and work is in progress that 
may allow analysis of a larger sample in the near future. 
10 
 
percent earners, and 9 for both the top 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent. This variability in available 
observations for each country causes an imbalance in our data panel.
16
 
Table 2 shows detailed information on average income for the four categories of top 
earners. The data shows a wide variability in average income of top earners across countries:  
evidently, some countries have richer rich than others. The United States is the country with the 
wealthiest rich among those countries with available data on top earners (and, most probably, in the 
entire world). The data also suggests that countries where GDP per capita is higher tend to have top 
earners with higher income. There are exceptions, however: Argentina, for example, with a 
relatively low GDP per capita (9,671 PPP dollars in 2005), and France, with relatively high GDP 
per capita (31,230 PPP dollars in 2005). Although French average income is much higher than that 
of Argentinians, top earners in both countries have similar incomes:  on average, the richest 0.01 
percent in France earned 2,057,056 PPP dollars in 2005, while their counterparts in Argentina 
earned 2,100,391 PPP dollars in 2004.
17
  
The Penn World Tables provide data on GDP per capita, which is our main explanatory 
variable. In addition, we use a variety of sources to obtain our control variables:  The Penn World 
Tables also provide the share of government consumption, as well as the share of international trade 
as a proportion of GDP.
18
 From the World Bank we obtain population growth and inflation.
19
 
Finally, we use the Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness.
20
 These variables are similar to those 
used by Dollar and Kray (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013). 
Table 3 shows the number of annual observations available for each of the variables in our 
regressions. Those with fewest observations are the average incomes of top earners; most of the 
other variables have information available for every year. Thus, the number of observations with 
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 Tables A1 through A4 provide further details on available information by country, year, and categories of 
top earners. 
17
 All quantities are expressed in constant 2005 PPP international dollars. 
18
 See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012). 
19
 See World Bank (2013). 
20
 See Chinn and Ito (2008). 
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which we perform our regression analysis is determined mostly by the availability of top income 
data. Table 4 also shows the number of annual observations for different sample specifications. 
3.2 Methodology 
Our empirical strategy closely follows the method developed by Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
who investigate the relationship between income of the poor and economic growth with an equation 
like the following: 
   
              
                (1) 
where   and   are indices for countries and years,    
  is the logarithm of average income of top 
earners in country   at time  ,     is the logarithm of average income of all earners in country   at 
time  , and     is a set of control variables. Dollar and Kraay (2002) are interested in growth and 
income of the poor; thus, instead of    
 , they have    
  as the dependent variable, where    
  is the 
logarithm of the average income of earners at the bottom of the distribution in country   at time  . 
The αs are parameters to be estimated and    is an unobserved country-specific effect.  
Following this method, we use GDP per capita to quantify average income of the whole 
population. Our control variables are the shares of government consumption and international trade 
as proportion of GDP, population growth, inflation, and financial openness. We choose this set of 
controls based on variables that Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013) include in their 
analysis on growth and income of the poor, but we use those that are most likely to be related to 
income of the rich. 
Since variables are expressed in logarithms, coefficient    in equation (1) measures the 
elasticity of income of top earners with respect to mean income (EIT). If     , then when average 
income grows, the mean income of top earners grows in the same proportion. If     , the average 
income of top earners grows proportionally more than that of all earners. If     , then the 
average income of top earners grows proportionally less. 
12 
 
In order to eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects   , we apply first differences 
to (1):  
   
         (   )
     (          (   ))    
 (          (   ))  (          (   ))     (2) 
where   is the year preceding   with information available.  
As in the previous literature, we face a problem of missing values for different years across 
countries. There is no clear way to solve this problem. In order to be transparent about our results, 
we follow two approaches for estimating equation (2). In the first approach,    ; thus,   is the 
first year preceding   with information available. We call this the one-period difference approach. 
Note that this approach does not necessarily take one-year differences because there might be years 
with missing values between two observations. Instead, we take one-period differences, each period 
being the immediately preceding year with available information. In the second approach,    ; 
thus,   is the period for the first five years preceding   with available data. We call this  approach, 
which is that taken by Andrews, Jencks, and Leigh (2011), the five-period difference approach. 
Again, these are not five-year differences because there might be years with missing values within 
five observations. In both approaches we restrict the period between   and     to ensure that it is 
no longer than ten years. We prefer the five-period over the one-period difference approach because 
it allows us to capture the change in incomes of both the whole population and the rich over longer 
periods of time, thus eliminating short-run effects. In any case, we also describe the robustness of 
our results to different specifications in the lag structure and sample.  
It is important to mention that when we estimate equation (2), we calculate the average 
annual log difference for every variable. In other words, we divide the difference for variable   
between period   and     over the number of years between period   and    . This procedure, 




We are interested in analyzing the relation between economic growth and changes in 
incomes of different categories of top earners. Thus, we estimate equations (1) and (2) using our 
four categories of top earners (top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent) as dependent 
variables, and we show results for each category. In this respect, our analysis improves on those of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2013). Where they use only one and two definitions of 
the poor, respectively, we use four definitions of the rich. This allows us to understand more 
thoroughly how economic growth is related to income gains in different groups at the top part of the 
distribution. In equation (1), we estimate robust standard errors using random and fixed effects. In 
equation (2) we correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the standard 
Newey-West procedure, following Dollar and Kraay (2002).
21
  
As Dollar and Kraay (2002) mention, there are several reasons why using an OLS estimator 
in equations (1) and (2) could result in inconsistent parameter estimates. We are mainly concerned 
with two of these reasons. First, although we use a set of control variables, there might be omitted 
variables that are correlated both with average income for the whole population and average income 
of top earners. Second, it might be the case that average income of the rich causes average income 
of the whole population. To assess these issues, we estimate equation (2) using both an OLS and an 
IV estimator. 
We base our instruments on those chosen by Dollar and Kraay (2002), using previous 
values of economic growth and GDP per capita. In particular, in the one-period difference approach 
we instrument the annual log difference of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log 
difference of GDP per capita one period before     and the level of GDP per capita two periods 
before    . In the five-period difference approach we instrument the annual log difference of 
GDP per capita between   and     with the corresponding value five periods before     and the 
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 We do not use cluster standard errors (at the country level). The intra-class correlation of GDP growth is 
close to zero and sometimes negative, which suggests that cluster standard errors will be, if anything, lower 
than those produced by the Newey-West methodology. We calculated the robust and cluster standard errors 
and determined that standard errors were marginally lower than those using Newey-West (results are 
available upon request). Hence, we decided to be conservative and use Newey-West standard errors. 
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level of GDP per capita seven periods before  . Since contemporaneous GDP per capita depends on 
previous values, our instrument is correlated with mean income. Our instruments are not correlated 
with the error term, provided that     is not correlated over time. In order to test whether our results 
hold to different specifications, we perform different robustness tests for equation (2) that we 
present in Section 4.1. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Figures 1 and 2 show a graphic description of our main findings. Figure 1 plots the 
logarithm average incomes of top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners, and 
the logarithm of GDP per capita (in constant 2005 USD adjusted by PPP). It shows a positive 
relation between income of top earners and GDP per capita, and the slope of richer earners is 
steeper than the slope of their less rich counterparts. This implies that the incomes of top 0.01 or 0.1 
percent earners rise proportionally more than the incomes of top 1 or 10 percent earners when 
average income grows (i.e., when economic growth takes place). Figure 2 illustrates this relation 
more clearly by plotting annual average growth in incomes of top earners and annual average 
growth in GDP per capita. In Figure 2 the slopes for the richest earners are steeper than the slopes 
of less rich earners. For top 10 percent earners the data is centered on the 45-degree line, which 
implies that the income of the richest 10 percent changes in approximately the same proportion as 
the income of the population as a whole. However, as we move to richer subgroups inside the top 
10 percent, changes in income of the rich are larger than changes in mean income. This suggests 
that economic growth is associated with larger income increases for the richest earners than for the 
population as a whole. 
In order to examine more thoroughly the graphic relations between incomes of the rich and 
mean incomes, we perform regression analysis using equations (1) and (2). Table 5 shows the 
results of regressing incomes of the rich only with respect to GDP per capita (  
   ). Panels A 
and B show estimates of equation (1); Panel A assumes fixed effects, and Panel B assumes random 
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effects. For top 10 percent earners,    is close to one, which implies that the average income of top 
10 percent earners increases in the same proportion as mean income. However, as suggested by 
Figures 1 and 2, for richer earners the value of    is bigger. For top 1 percent earners, the elasticity 
of income of top earners with respect to mean income (EIT) is close to 1.3, meaning that, on 
average, incomes of this group of earners increase proportionally more than mean income. Panels A 
and B of Table 5 also show that    for top 0.1 and 0.01 percent earners is close to 1.8 and above 
2.0, respectively; thus, with economic growth, the average income of the richest earners grows more 
than average income of their less rich counterparts. Increases in GDP of 1 percent per capita are 
associated with increases of more than 2 percent in the average income of top 0.01 percent earners. 
Panels C and D of Table 5 show estimates of equation (2) using our two alternative 
approaches. In the five-period difference approach, EIT estimates are very similar to those obtained 
with equation (1). In the one-period approach, EIT estimates are slightly smaller than those obtained 
with the other specifications. In any case, the increasing pattern of    described above still holds in 
these results. In Panels A to C, the EIT for top 10 percent earners is not significantly different from 
one, whereas in Panel D it is significantly below unity. However, for top 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 
0.01 percent earners we can reject the null hypothesis that     ; i.e.,    is statistically larger than 
one.  
In Table 6, we extend our analysis by analyzing whether variables that are related to growth 
are also related to income of the rich. Panel A of Table 6 shows estimates under our five-period 
difference approach, and Panel B shows them under the one-period approach. In Panel A, 
elasticities of incomes of top earners with respect to mean incomes remain very similar to estimates 
obtained not including controls (see Table 5). In Panel B, estimates for top 10 percent, 1 percent and 
0.1 percent earners are very similar to those obtained with previous specifications. However, the    
estimate for top 0.01 percent earners falls well below those obtained in previous regressions. We 
consider that this result highlights the importance of using longer periods of time to estimate 
income growth, especially when estimating the EIT for the richest earners, since they can modify 
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their income more easily than other groups of earners, and their income growth may be accrued 
over a longer period of time.
22
 As in the analyses of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. 
(2013) of the income of the poor, we do not find variables correlated to growth being consistently 
correlated to income. 
As explained in the previous section, we estimate equation (2) using instrumental variables. 
Table 7 shows first stage regressions using the instruments previously defined for both our five-
period and one-period difference approaches. Our instruments in the first stage regressions are 
always statistically significant with large values in the F-test, and the overidentification test is not 
rejected in any specification at the one percent level of significance. In Table 8 we present the 
second stage regression results for these IV estimations. The findings from previous regressions 
remain:     is always highly statistically significant, and it is higher for the richest earners. As 
before, the increasing pattern of EIT shown in previous regressions holds in our IV estimation, with 
the exception of top 0.01 percent earners in the one-period difference approach. Furthermore, 
comparing Panels B of Tables 6 and 8, we find that IV estimates are higher than OLS estimates in 
our one-period approach, and are closer to estimates using other specifications.  
In sum, the income of the top 10 percent earners grows in the same proportion as mean 
income, and our findings also allow us to establish the direction of causation:  when mean income 
grows, the income of top 10 percent earners grows in the same proportion, and the income of top 1 
percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners grows even more than average income. This implies 
that growth is good for the rich, but that it is better for the richest earners, those at the very top of 
the income distribution. 
4.1 Robustness 
In order to check whether our results are robust to different sample specifications, we 
estimate equation (2) with both the one-period and the five-period difference approaches using 
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In his analysis of the responses of top earners to changes in marginal tax rates, Goolsbee (2000) provides 




different country samples. First, we run regressions using observations only from those countries 
that have data for all categories of top earners (top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.01 
percent).
23
 We do so because there are countries that lack data for all four categories, presenting the 
possibility of bias due to the influence of countries with higher (or lower) EITs on    in a particular 
category of top earners.  
We also estimate equation (2) using only observations from English-speaking countries.
24
 
We do this to test the findings compiled in Atkinson and Piketty (2007) indicating that in recent 
decades, the shares of top earners in those countries have risen more than in other countries, 
particularly continental European countries. Additionally, we estimate the equation using data from 
non-English-speaking countries to test whether our findings hold for those countries or are driven 
mainly by soaring top shares in English-speaking countries. Finally, we estimate the equation 
excluding observations from China. Unlike other countries, Chinese top income data in the WTI 
database is based largely on household surveys rather than tax returns; we therefore exclude China 
to test for any estimation bias arising from this difference in the raw source of Chinese data.  
Table 9 shows the results of our robustness tests with the five-period difference approach on 
equation (1). Panels A and B show estimates with all countries in our dataset, as reviewed in the 
preceding tables. Panels C and D show estimates using only countries that have information for all 
categories of top earners. In this case, estimates of    follow the same pattern of increase found in 
all previous exercises:  the richer the earner, the higher the elasticity of income to mean income.  
In Panels E and F we include only English-speaking countries to test whether they have 
larger elasticities. As the work compiled in Atkinson and Piketty (2007) suggests, elasticities for top 
10 percent earners in English-speaking countries are smaller than those for top 10 percent earners 
using all the countries in our database. In fact, they are statistically smaller than one, which means 
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 Countries that have information for all categories of top earners are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
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that when economies grow, the average income of top 10 percent earners in English-speaking 
countries grows proportionally less. However, elasticities for top 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent 
earners in English-speaking countries are larger than those for the sample of all countries. The EIT 
of top 0.01 percent earners in English-speaking countries is larger than 3, implying that gains from 
economic growth for the richest earners are larger in those countries than in other places. This result 
is in line with findings in the work compiled by Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
Panels G and H show estimates for non-English-speaking countries. Elasticities in these 
countries are very similar to those reported for the sample of all countries in our database, 
suggesting that higher values of EIT for the richest earners is not a result driven by the enormous 
gains obtained by those earners in English-speaking countries. There seems to be a pattern that is 
also present outside English-speaking countries, in which richer earners gain more from economic 
growth. Finally, Panels I and J show estimates excluding China from the sample. Estimates of    
remain very similar, suggesting that inclusion of China in the analysis does not greatly influence the 
estimates. 
In Table 10 we replicate Table 9, but with the one-period difference approach. Panels A and 
B indicate that estimates are smaller than those obtained using five-period differences but, with few 
exceptions, they move upwards when we use instruments. As mentioned previously, we believe this 
is a consequence of one-period-difference observations failing to capture longer-term variations in 
income growth of the richest earners.  
Other sample specifications using the one-period difference approach yield conclusions 
similar to those using the five-period difference:     estimates using only countries with data on all 
categories of earners are similar to those obtained using all countries in the sample;    estimates for 
English-speaking countries are larger for the richest earners than those obtained using all countries 
in the sample; elasticities are similar whether China is included or excluded. There is, however, one 
significant change:  when we use non-English-speaking countries,    for top 0.01 percent earners 
falls, and becoming non-significantly different from unity. This result suggests that the richest 
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earners in non-English-speaking countries take much smaller gains from economic growth than the 
richest earners in English-speaking countries. This is a different story than the one told by the five-
period difference approach, and we believe that further country case research can address this 
particular result. 
Additional robustness tests are shown in Table 11. As mentioned earlier, for some countries 
there is data for the entire period analyzed, whereas others have fewer observations. We believe that 
this imbalance could cause some countries to bias estimates based on the whole set of observations. 
In an attempt to address this problem, we estimate equation (2) using observations that are separated 
by a five-year interval.
25
 By using only these observations, we eliminate a larger share of 
information from those countries that have more data, providing greater balance in our panel 
dataset.
26
 Panel A of Table 11 shows results obtained through this procedure. We find the same 
increasing pattern of    obtained in previous regressions, and estimates are very similar to those 
with other specifications.  
Following Dollar and Kraay (2002), we also estimate equation (2) using observations that 
are separated by at least five years.
27
 Panel B in Table 11 shows estimates under this procedure, and 
they are very similar to those of other specifications. 
Panels C and D of Table 11 show IV estimates for our five-period and one-period difference 
approaches using alternative instruments. For the five-period difference approach, instead of 
instrumenting the annual log difference of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log 
difference of GDP per capita five periods before     and the level of GDP per capita seven 
periods before  , we instrument with the annual log difference of GDP per capita seven periods 
before     and the level of GDP per capita eight periods before  . Panel C shows the results with 
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 We use the annual log difference, as described in Section 3. 
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 We try to use data only for years 2010, 2005, 2000, 1995, 1990, 1985 and 1980; however, not every 
country has available information for every category of top earner for these years. Where this is the case, we 
take the data point available for the nearest year, provided that that year differs by not more than two years. 
27
 E.g., we take the annual log difference between 2010 and 2005, but if data is not available for 2005, we 
take the value of the next available year, provided that that year differs by not more than ten years. 
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these instruments, which are very similar to those obtained with the previous ones. For the one-
period difference approach, instead of instrumenting the annual log difference of GDP per capita 
between   and     with the annual log difference of GDP per capita one period before     and 
the level of GDP per capita two periods before    , we instrument with the annual log difference 
of GDP per capita two periods before     and the level of GDP per capita three periods before 




Robustness tests indicate that the estimated value of    for top 10 percent earners is in most 
cases not statistically different from one. This suggests that growth is good for earners in the top 
decile of the income distribution in the sense that when economies grow, the average income of this 
segment of the population grows in the same proportion as that of the whole population. For earners 
in the top percentile of the income distribution,    is greater than one in most sample specifications. 
For the richest earners for whom data is available (top 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent),    is always 
larger than one and in many cases it is close to or even greater than two, indicating that on average, 
economic growth brings much larger gains for the richest earners than for the rest of the population. 
Figure 3 provides a visual summary of the previous paragraph. It illustrates our preferred 
estimates for   , i.e. OLS and IV estimates obtained when regressing equation (2) under the five-
period difference approach for all countries in the sample, and including controls (Panel B of Table 
9a). The figure clearly shows that economic growth is good for the rich, but that it is really good for 
the really rich. As suggested by the confidence intervals shown, standard errors are, in general, 
larger for the top 0.1 percent and particularly for the top 0.01 percent than for top 10 percent and 1 
percent earners. This may suggest that there is a wide variance across countries in the gains that the 
richest earners take from economic growth. However, we think that the larger variance for the very 
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 We further extend our analysis of estimates under the alternative sets of instruments. In Tables A.5 and A.6 
we show IV estimates obtained using equation (2) under our five-period and one-period difference approach, 
with different sample specifications and alternative sets of instruments. As shown in the tables, results remain 
very similar to those obtained with the original sets of instruments. 
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rich is at least in part attributable to a sample size that is smaller than that of the other estimates. 
Despite the larger size of the standard errors for the richest earners, our robustness tests support the 
conclusion that at least since the 1980s, economic growth has, on average, been good for the rich, 
and really good for the really rich. 
4.2 The EIT in periods of negative GDP per capita growth 
We perform one additional extension to our analysis of economic growth and the income of 
the rich. We are interested in knowing whether elasticities of the income of top earners with respect 
to mean incomes are different in periods when the change in GDP per capita is negative. To 
investigate this question, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one in periods when 
growth in GDP per capita is negative, and we multiply it by the annual log difference in GDP per 
capita. We include this variable as a control in our five-period difference regressions with equation 
(2). 
Table 12 shows the results. The interaction is always negative and highly statistically 
significant. Moreover, including the interaction in our set of controls does not essentially change    
estimates. This means that the EIT is smaller during periods of economic crisis, which implies that 
when the average income of the population as a whole decreases, the average income of the rich 
also decreases, but proportionally less than it increases in a growing economy. In fact, negative 
estimates of coefficients of the interaction yield EIT values for top 10 percent earners that are 
significantly smaller than one in periods of economic crisis, meaning that this segment of the 
population is less affected by economic downturns than the rest of the population. For top 1 percent 
and 0.1 percent earners the coefficient of the interaction effect is large enough to preclude rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the EIT of top 1 percent and 0.1 percent earners is equal to one during 
periods of negative growth; in other words, during economic downturns these groups fare as badly 
in average income growth as the rest of the population. Although the interaction takes the highest 
value for top 0.01 percent earners, it is not high enough for that group to bring the EIT to one. 
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In sum, changes in economic activity affect the rich differently in good times and bad. In 
good times, the income of the rich changes proportionally more with economic activity in 
comparison with periods of economic downturn. In fact, we could say that crises are not bad for top 
10 percent earners, in the sense that when mean income falls, the average income of top 10 percent 
earners falls proportionally less. 
4.2 Discussion 
Piketty and Saez (2006), Alvaredo et al. (2013b), and Atkinson et al. (2011) show that since 
the 1980s, many countries have witnessed a rise in the income share of top earners.
29
 Our findings 
are in line with this trend:  if the elasticity of income of top earners with respect to mean income 
during the 1980-2011 period is larger than one, then their income increases in a larger proportion 
than average income. If this occurs over a long period of time, the income share of top earners will 
therefore rise. We have also found that    is larger than one for top 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 
percent earners, and that                                , suggesting that income shares for these 
groups of earners have increased since the 1980s. Indeed, the work collected in Atkinson and 
Piketty (2007) describes how income shares of top 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners 
have in recent decades increased in many countries. These articles also show that, in many 
countries, income shares of the richest earners (e.g., the top 0.01 percent) have increased more than 
the income shares of less rich earners (e.g., the top 1 percent). This is in line with our result that 
            is larger than         .  
Saez (2013) describes income trends for top 1 percent earners compared with the rest of the 
population in the United States in the period 1993-2012. Since 1993, top 1 percent earners in the 
U.S. have captured 68 percent of total income gains, while since the recovery from the Great 
Recession, income gains for that group have been even greater:  from 2009 to 2012, they captured 
95% of total income gains. Hungerford (2011) also describes how rich earners in the United States 
                                                          
29
 An example of this rise in top income shares in the United States is described by Saez (2013): “The top 
decile income share in 2012 is equal to 50.4%, the highest ever since 1917 when [the top income series in the 
United States] started.” 
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have captured larger gains from economic growth than other groups. He notes that from 1996 to 
2006 the poorest 20 percent of tax filers experienced a 6 percent decrease in income, while the 
richest 0.1 percent doubled their income. Although we perform cross-country analysis rather than 
focusing on only one country, Saez’s (2013) and Hungerford’s (2011) findings for the United States 
may turn out to be a representative example of what has happened with top income groups in many 
countries. 
It is important to note that our findings may imply that some groups of earners in the top 
decile of the income distribution have elasticities less than one. Top 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 
percent earners are included in the top 10 percent, and they have elasticities greater than one. Thus, 
the richest earners may be averaging upwards the elasticities of their less rich counterparts. 
Therefore, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that incomes of the less rich among the rich increase 
proportionally less than mean incomes. Our results may suggest that inequality even among the rich 
has been increasing in recent decades.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We know from the work of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and others that growth is good for the 
poor. We have now shown that growth is also good for the rich, and that it is particularly good for 
the extremely rich. It is indeed likely that growth is good for almost everyone--in which case we 
should care about economic growth as a means of increasing the welfare of society. However, the 
fact that in a growing economy, the income of earners in the top one percent of the income 
distribution and above increases proportionally more than mean income implies that earners in other 
parts of the income distribution must be increasing their income proportionally less than mean 
income. This suggests that we should also care about policies that are not necessarily related to 
promoting economic growth, since benefits from economic growth are not evenly distributed, as 
argued by Basu (2013) and Foster and Szekely (2000, 2008).  
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We have seen throughout this work that economic growth is good for the rich in the sense 
that it causes the income of the richest earners in the distribution to grow in at least the same 
proportion. Nevertheless, we do not rule out the possibility of underlying economic and political 
forces that drive this relation between economic growth and the income of the rich. Technological 
shifts or changes in political or bargaining power of the rich could drive the gains from growth to 
the higher part of the income distribution.
30
 We also have to recognize that economic phenomena 
are not perpetual, that things change, and that our findings might be particular to the period 
analyzed and not sustained over larger periods of time. 
There are ways in which this work might be extended. One of these is to analyze the 
relation between growth and other parts of the income distribution. We have shown that benefits 
from growth are unevenly distributed within the top part of the distribution; additional research 
could analyze which parts of the income distribution are losing the income gains associated with 
economic growth.  
The analysis performed in this study could also be extended to examine the social 
desirability of our finding that when economies grow, the income of the richest earners grows 
proportionally more than mean income. There are arguments that favor this result as desirable. It 
might be argued that larger benefits from economic growth creates incentives for the rich to 
increase investment and production, which in turn creates economic growth, thus benefitting the 
whole population, and that even if incomes of some earners grow in a smaller proportion than mean 
incomes, they do still grow. Thus, even if economic growth does not benefit everyone in the same 
way, people are better off with growth than without it. And if the rich have to get larger gains from 
growth in order to continue investing, then having      could be socially desirable.  
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 Piketty et al. (2011) present evidence that a large part of the income of top earners is determined by their 
bargaining power and not by their marginal product. Bivens and Mishel (2013) argue that the increase in 
wages for top 1 percent earners in the last three decades is a result of the creation of economic rents and not 
only increases in their productivity. 
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However, there are also arguments that consider findings in this work as socially harmful. 
In countries with significant economic inequality (like many of those included in our regressions), 
the rich getting larger shares from a growing economy could create still more inequality. Corak 
(2013) describes how greater inequality is associated with lower intergenerational mobility, arguing 
that “inequality lowers mobility because it shapes opportunity” (p. 98). Top earners increasing their 
income share and their children’s access to human capital formation implies an economic advantage 
over earners at the bottom, which reduces the chances that hard work and talent will determine 
individual economic outcomes. Countries could promote policy mechanisms (progressive income 
taxation, for example) so that benefits from growth are more equally distributed. As Bivens and 
Mishel (2013) and Hungerford (2012) note, such policies can be established without negative 
impact on economic growth. In this work we provide data that contributes to the debate, but we do 





Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013). The top 1 percent in international and 
historical perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 3-20.  
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013b). The World Top Incomes Database. 
 http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. 
Andrews, D., Jencks, C., & Leigh, A. (2011). Do rising top incomes lift all boats? The BE Journal 
of Economic Analysis and Policy, 11(1), 1-43.  
Atkinson, A. B. (2002). Top incomes in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Discussion 
Paper in Economic and Social History, no. 43. 
Atkinson, A. B. (2007). Measuring Top Incomes:  Methodological Issues. In Atkinson A. B., & 
Piketty T. (Eds.). Top incomes over the twentieth century:  A contrast between continental 
European and English-speaking countries. Chapter 2, pp. 18-42. Oxford University Press.   
Atkinson, A. B., & Leigh, A. (2007). The distribution of top incomes in Australia. Economic 
Record, 83(262), 247-261.  
Atkinson A. B., & Piketty T. (Eds.). (2007). Top incomes over the twentieth century:  A contrast 
between continental European and English-speaking countries. Oxford University Press.  
Atkinson A. B., & Piketty T. (Eds.). (2010). Top incomes:  A global perspective. Oxford University 
Press.  
Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2011). Top incomes in the long run of history. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 49(1), 3-71.  
Basu, K. (2013). Shared prosperity and the mitigation of poverty. In practice and in precept. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 6700, November.  
Bivens, J., & Mishel, L. (2013). The pay of corporate executives and financial professionals as 
evidence of rents in top 1 percent incomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 57-78.  
Burkhauser, R. V., Hahn, M. H., & Wilkins, R. (2013). Measuring top incomes using tax record 
data:  A cautionary tale from Australia. Unpublished manuscript.  
Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2008). A New Measure of Financial Openness. Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis, 10(3), 309-322. 
Corak, M. (2013). Income inequality, equality of opportunity, and intergenerational mobility. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 79-102.  
Dollar, D., Kleineberg, T., & Kraay, A. (2013). Growth still is good for the poor. Policy Research 
Working Paper 6568,  
27 
 
Dollar, D., & Kraay, A. (2002). Growth is good for the poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(3), 
195-225.  
Dollar, D., & Kraay, A. (2002 b). Growth is good for the poor:  A response to Lubker, Smith and 
Weeks. Unpublished manuscript.  
Feenberg, D. R., & Poterba, J. M. (1993). Income inequality and the incomes of very high-income 
taxpayers:  Evidence from tax returns. In J. Poterba (Ed.), Tax policy and the economy (pp. 
145-177) MIT Press.  
Foster, J., & Szekely, M. (2000). How good is growth? Asian Development Review, 18(2), 59-73.  
Foster, J. E., & Szekely, M. (2008). Is economic growth good for the poor? Tracking low incomes 
using general means. International Economic Review, 49(4), 1143-1172.  
Gallup, J., Radelet, S., & Warner, A. (1998). Economic growth and the income of the poor. CAER 
II, Discussion Paper no. 36,  
Goolsbee, A. (2000). What happens when you tax the rich? evidence from executive 
compensation. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 352-378.  
Goolsbee, A., Hall, R. E., & Katz, L. F. (1999). Evidence on the high-income Laffer curve from six 
decades of tax reform. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1999(2), 1-64.  
Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B. (2012). Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania 
URL http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
Hungerford, T. (2011). Changes in the distribution of income among tax filers between 1996 and 
2006:  The role of labor income, capital income, and tax policy. Congressional Research 
Service, 1-18.  
Hungerford, T. (2012). Taxes and the economy:  An economic analysis of the top tax rates since 
1945. Congressional Research Service, 1-20.  
Kuznets, S. (1953). Shares of upper income groups in income and savings. National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  
Lübker, M., Smith, G., & Weeks, J. (2002). Growth and the poor:  A comment on Dollar and Kraay. 
Journal of International Development, 14(5), 555-571.  
Piketty, T. (2001). Les hauts revenus en france au 20e siècle:  Inégalités et redistribution, 1901–
1998. Paris:  Bernard Gasset.  
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2003). Income inequality in the United States, 1913-1998. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(1), 1-39.  
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2006). The evolution of top incomes:  A historical and international 
perspective. American Economic Review, 96(2), 200-200.  
28 
 
Piketty, T., Saez, E. & Stantcheva, S. (2011) Optimal labor income taxation:  A tale of three 
elasticities. NBER Working Paper no. 17616.  
Piketty, T., & Zucman, G. (2013). Capital is back:  Wealth-income ratios in rich countries, 1700-
2010. CEPR Discussion Paper no. DP9588, 1-42.  
Roemer, M., & Gugerty, M. (1997). Does economic growth reduce poverty? CAER II, Discussion 
Paper no. 4.  
Saez, E. (2001). Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 68(1), 205-229.  
Saez, E. (2012). Striking it richer:  The evolution of top incomes in the United States. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Saez, E. (2013). Striking it richer:  The evolution of top incomes in the United States. Real World 
Economics Review, 65, 120-129.  




Figure 1. Levels 
 
Sources:  Incomes of top earners from the World Top Incomes database. GDP per capita from the 
Penn World Tables. 
Note:  This figure shows pooled data of the logarithm of average income of top earners and the 
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Figure 2. Annual Average Growth Rates 
 
Sources:  Incomes of top earners from the World Top Incomes database; GDP per capita from the 
Penn World Tables. 
Note:  This figure shows pooled data for the annualized change in the logarithm of average 
incomes of different categories of top earners and the annualized change of the logarithm in GDP 
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Figure 3. Preferred Estimates of the Elasticity of  
Income of Top Earners to Mean Income (   ) 
 
Note:  This figure shows    estimates using equation (2) including controls 
under the five-period difference approach, using observations from all 
countries in our dataset. Black lines show the upper and lower bounds of the 95 




Table 1. Number of Annual Observations of Average Income of Top Earners 
(1980-2011) 
  Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
Argentina 0 8 8 8 
Australia 31 31 31 14 
Canada 21 21 21 21 
China 18 18 17 0 
Colombia 0 18 16 5 
Denmark 31 31 31 31 
France 30 30 27 27 
Germany 7 7 7 7 
India 0 20 20 20 
Ireland 30 30 11 0 
Italy 28 28 28 28 
Japan 31 31 31 31 
Mauritius 18 28 18 0 
New Zealand 31 31 10 0 
Norway 29 29 29 0 
Portugal 20 20 20 17 
Singapore 30 30 17 3 
South Africa 0 13 9 9 
Spain 30 30 30 30 
Sweden 32 32 32 32 
Switzerland 22 22 22 22 
United Kingdom 19 19 16 0 
United States 32 32 32 32 
Total 490 559 483 337 
Source:  World Top Incomes database. 
Note:  This table shows the number of available annual observations for top earners’ 




Table 2. Average Income of Top Earners in 2005 
Constant 2005 international dollars (PPP) 
 Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% GDP per 
capita 

























 N.A. 4,335  
Colombia N.A. 126,274 529,926 
/5
 N.A. 6,491 
Denmark 402,055 933,774 2,477,789 8,239,257 34,677 
France 91,486 242,990 688,929 2,057,056 31,230 








 31,657  






 2,492  
Ireland N.A. 40,247 389,030 N.A. 122,161 
Italy 65,490 184,482 546,540 1,744,193 29,562 
Japan 78,045 181,283 476,827 1,346,970 31,380 
Mauritius 20,185 73,133 232,128 N.A. 8,360 
New Zealand 73,191 174,850 N.A. N.A. 27,254 
Norway 110,293 486,250 2,463,727 N.A. 49,293 
Portugal 76,364 194,987 494,308 1,383,502 19,949 
Singapore 133,825 475,693 1,537,172 N.A. 41,989 
South Africa N.A. 118,428 353,210 1,021,447 6,767 
Spain 66,702 176,327 525,501 1,749,056 28,325 
Sweden 60,546 142,789 428,248 1,433,022 33,959 
Switzerland 119,000 367,168 1,366,432 5,636,665 36,994 
United Kingdom 110,209 377,339 1,374,309 N.A. 33,983 
United States 210,406 827,832 3,633,734 15,394,558 42,482 
Mean 107,569 272,428 992,208 3,603,004 30,473 




 In 1998. 
/3
 In 2000. 
/4
 In 2003. 
/5
 In 2006. 
/6
 In 1999. 
Sources:  Data on top earners from the World Top Incomes database. GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables. 
Note:  This table shows average income for different categories of top earners in 2005 (unless otherwise noted). 
Incomes and GDP per capita are shown in constant 2005 international PPP dollars.  
34 
 




























Argentina 0 8 8 8 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Australia 31 31 31 14 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Canada 21 31 21 21 31 31 31 32 32 32 
China 18 18 18 0 31 31 31 28 32 25 
Colombia 0 18 16 5 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Denmark 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 
France 30 30 27 27 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Finland 0 0 0 0 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Germany 7 7 7 7 31 31 31 32 32 20 
India 0 20 20 20 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Ireland 30 30 11 0 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Italy 28 28 28 28 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Japan 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Mauritius 18 28 19 0 31 31 31 32 32 32 
New Zealand 31 31 10 0 32 31 31 32 31 32 
Norway 29 29 29 0 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Portugal 20 20 20 17 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Singapore 30 30 17 3 31 31 31 32 32 32 
South Africa 0 13 9 9 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Spain 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Sweden 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Switzerland 22 22 22 22 31 31 31 16 32 32 
United Kingdom 19 19 16 0 31 31 31 32 32 23 
United States 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 32 32 32 
Total 490 569 485 337 745 744 744 748 767 740 
Sources:  Average income of top 10 percent, 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent earners from the World Top Incomes database; GDP 
per capita, government consumption, and openness as share of GDP from the Penn World Tables; population growth and inflation from 
the World Bank, and financial openness from the Chinn-Ito index. 
Note:  This table shows the number of available annual observations for all variables used in our regressions in the period 1980-2011.  
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Table 4. Number of Annual Observations for Different Sample Specifications 
(1980-2011) 
  Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 
0.01% 
     
Observations in all countries 490 559 483 337 
Developed countries
/1 
434 434 375 278 
Developing countries
/2 
56 125 108 59 
      
Only countries with data for all 




345 345 329 295 
Developed countries 325 325 309 278 
Developing countries 20 20 20 17 
/1
 Developed countries are:  Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
/2
 Developing countries are:  Argentina, China, Colombia, India, Mauritius, Portugal, and South 
Africa. 
/3
 Countries that have data for all categories of top earners are:  Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
Source:  World Top Incomes database. 






Table 5.   Estimates, Not Including Controls. OLS 
Average income of:  Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Fixed Effects         
Log of GDP per capita 1.014*** 1.374*** 1.850*** 2.403*** 
  (0.0618) (0.0912) (0.193) (0.358) 
          
P-Ho:       0.819 0.000469 0.000223 0.00123 
No. of Observations 473 542 470 323 
          
B. Random Effects         
Log of GDP per capita 1.015*** 1.347*** 1.765*** 2.155*** 
  (0.0600) (0.0821) (0.167) (0.274) 
          
P-Ho:       0.804 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 473 542 470 323 
          
C. First Differences (five-period difference)     
Log of GDP per capita 0.984*** 1.365*** 1.814*** 2.492*** 
  (0.0377) (0.0479) (0.0913) (0.163) 
          
P-Ho:       0.669 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 385 434 362 250 
          
D. First Differences (one-period difference)     
Log of GDP per capita 0.790*** 1.107*** 1.554*** 1.739*** 
  (0.0659) (0.0897) (0.159) (0.323) 
          
P-Ho:       0.00151 0.235 0.000528 0.0226 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313 
          
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equations (1) (Panels A and B) and (2) (Panels C 
and D) using all observations in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least squares. For equation 
(1), clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis; for equation (2), Newey-West standard 




Table 6. OLS Estimates, in Differences 
 Average income of:  Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01%   Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  A. Five-period difference   B. One-period difference 
Log of GDP per capita 1.026*** 1.491*** 1.880*** 2.472***   0.820*** 1.075*** 1.440*** 1.285** 
  (0.0400) (0.0656) (0.120) (0.206)   (0.081) (0.113) (0.193) (0.510) 
Share of gov. consumption 0.024*** 0.0232** 0.011 0.027   0.023** 0.006 0.0002 0.034 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.016) (0.026)   (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.046) 
Openness as share of GDP 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 0.008***   0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013* 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) 
Financial openness -0.009 -0.008 0.007 -0.114***   0.003 0.013 0.026 -0.009 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.023)   (0.006) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) 
Population growth -0.002 -0.010 0.025 0.039   0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.079 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.027) (0.043)   (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.082) 
Inflation -0.0004 0.005** 0.007** 0.007   -2.74e-05 0.0002 0.001 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
                    
P-Ho:       0.511 0 0 0   0.0276 0.506 0.0227 0.576 
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247   467 534 461 313 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) using our five-period and one-period difference approaches. OLS refers to ordinary least 
squares. Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  A. Five-period difference   B. One-period difference 
Share of gov. consumption -0.041*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.019***   -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.037*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Openness as share of GDP 0.001*** 0.0018*** 0.0015*** 0.0002   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001)   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Financial openness 0.002 0.0089* 0.0053 -0.0047   -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Population growth 0.004 0.0036 -0.0137 0.0117   0.0001 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0013 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0074) 
Inflation 0.001 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.004***   -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Change in GDP per capita 0.369*** 0.322*** 0.282*** -0.062   0.143*** 0.189*** 0.155*** 0.189*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.056)   (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) 
Level of GDP per capita 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002***   0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
                    
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247   467 534 461 313 
                    
Weak identification test (F statistic) 90.236 57.341 53.215 58.187   70.513 67.795 147.704 42.579 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.9695 0.1399 0.0298 0.5852   0.6153 0.3774 0.7698 0.1262 
Note:  This table shows first-stage results of estimating equation (2) with our five-period and one-period difference approaches. Newey-West standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8. IV Estimates, in First Differences 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01%   Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  A. Five-period difference   B. One-period difference 
Log of GDP per capita 1.130*** 1.638*** 2.031*** 2.798***   1.212*** 1.633*** 1.804*** 1.507** 
  (0.0485) (0.0929) (0.192) (0.326)   (0.204) (0.291) (0.447) (0.672) 
Share of gov. consumption 0.0277*** 0.0271*** 0.0140 0.0287   0.0368** 0.0249 0.0127 0.0398 
  (0.00585) (0.0103) (0.0165) (0.0261)   (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.0270) (0.0524) 
Openness as share of GDP -0.000153 -0.00120** -0.000674 0.00512   -0.000143 -0.000575 0.00131 0.0121 
  (0.000337) (0.000550) (0.00116) (0.00334)   (0.000736) (0.00117) (0.00219) (0.00782) 
Financial openness -0.0134* -0.0139 0.00234 -0.110***   -0.00190 0.00525 0.0210 -0.00854 
  (0.00691) (0.0114) (0.0206) (0.0229)   (0.00714) (0.0121) (0.0202) (0.0210) 
Population growth -0.00227 -0.00980 0.0256 0.0321   0.00186 -0.00135 0.00867 -0.0826 
  (0.00521) (0.00910) (0.0280) (0.0439)   (0.00609) (0.00823) (0.0132) (0.0824) 
Inflation 0.000162 0.00534** 0.00754** 0.00933   0.000195 0.00120 0.00188 0.00430 
 (0.00240) (0.00217) (0.00346) (0.00642)   (0.00120) (0.00182) (0.00262) (0.00538) 
                    
P-Ho:       0.007 0 0 0   0.299 0.030 0.0727 0.451 
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247   467 534 461 313 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) using our five-period and one-period difference approaches. IV refers to instrumental variables. 
Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9a. OLS and IV Estimates. Five-period Difference 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS   IV 
                    
  A. All countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.984*** 1.365*** 1.814*** 2.492***   1.046*** 1.437*** 1.893*** 2.657*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0377) (0.0479) (0.0913) (0.163)   (0.0451) (0.0600) (0.109) (0.174) 
P-Ho:       0.669 0 0 0   0.304 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 385 434 362 250   385 434 362 250 
                    
  B. All countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.026*** 1.491*** 1.880*** 2.472***   1.130*** 1.638*** 2.031*** 2.798*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0400) (0.0656) (0.120) (0.206)   (0.0485) (0.0929) (0.192) (0.326) 
P-Ho:       0.511 0 0 0   0.00756 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247   382 431 359 247 
                    
  C. Countries with data for all categories of earners, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.000*** 1.326*** 1.873*** 2.372***   1.023*** 1.417*** 1.995*** 2.493*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0667) (0.0781) (0.111) (0.156)   (0.0736) (0.0868) (0.123) (0.169) 
P-Ho:       1.000 0 0 0   0.754 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 273 273 258 228   273 273 258 228 
                    
  D. Countries with data for all categories of earners, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.997*** 1.355*** 1.946*** 2.229***   1.011*** 1.562*** 2.461*** 2.697*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0523) (0.0952) (0.148) (0.243)   (0.0663) (0.122) (0.200) (0.320) 
P-Ho:       0.951 0.000239 0 0   0.874 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 270 270 255 225   270 270 255 225 
                    
  E. English-speaking  countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.860*** 1.510*** 2.385*** 3.184***   0.893*** 1.535*** 2.357*** 3.355*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0405) (0.0776) (0.193) (0.272)   (0.0523) (0.0976) (0.205) (0.296) 
P-Ho:       0.000726 0 0 0   0.0419 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 132 132 90 53   132 132 90 53 
                    
  F. English-speaking  countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.761*** 1.818*** 2.036*** 3.596***   0.973*** 2.244*** 1.812*** 3.627*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0867) (0.181) (0.345) (0.416)   (0.125) (0.268) (0.409) (0.554) 
P-Ho:       0.00662 0 0.00355 0   0.829 0 0.0502 0 
No. of Observations 132 132 90 53   132 132 90 53 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) with our five-period difference approach using different sets of 
observations in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least squares; IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West standard 




Table 9b. OLS and IV Estimates. Five-period Difference 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS   IV 
                    
  G. Non-English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.038*** 1.311*** 1.705*** 2.331***   1.112*** 1.399*** 1.792*** 2.500*** 
Newey-West SE (0.049) (0.058) (0.097) (0.188)   (0.058) (0.074) (0.123) (0.204) 
P-Ho:       0.445 0 0 0   0.0552 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 253 302 272 197   253 302 272 197 
                    
  H. Non-English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.053*** 1.382*** 1.753*** 2.227***   1.150*** 1.487*** 1.910*** 2.545*** 
Newey-West SE (0.045) (0.072) (0.125) (0.226)   (0.067) (0.110) (0.219) (0.422) 
P-Ho:       0.240 0 0 0   0.0279 0 0 0.000323 
No. of Observations 250 299 269 194   250 299 269 194 
                    
  I. Excluding China, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.940*** 1.382*** 1.975*** 2.492***   0.958*** 1.556*** 2.144*** 2.472*** 
Newey-West SE (0.043) (0.0560) (0.105) (0.163)   (0.050) (0.085) (0.144) (0.206) 
P-Ho:       0.171 0 0 0   0.405 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 373 422 350 250   370 419 347 247 
                    
  J. Excluding China, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.998*** 1.460*** 2.088*** 2.657***   1.055*** 1.771*** 2.493*** 2.798*** 
Newey-West SE (0.053) (0.068) (0.120) (0.174)   (0.064) (0.111) (0.206) (0.326) 
P-Ho:       0.971 0 0 0   0.396 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 373 422 350 250   370 419 347 247 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) with our five-period difference approach using different sets of 
observations in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least squares; IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West standard 




Table 10a. OLS and IV Estimates. One-period Difference 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS   IV 
                    
  A. All countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.790*** 1.107*** 1.554*** 1.739***   1.141*** 1.571*** 1.929*** 2.141*** 
Newey-West SE (0.065) (0.089) (0.159) (0.323)   (0.161) (0.227) (0.354) (0.533) 
P-Ho:       0.00151 0.235 0.000528 0.0226   0.380 0.0120 0.00892 0.0329 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313   467 534 461 313 
                   
  B. All countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.820*** 1.075*** 1.440*** 1.285**   1.212*** 1.633*** 1.804*** 1.507** 
Newey-West SE (0.081) (0.113) (0.193) (0.510)   (0.204) (0.291) (0.447) (0.672) 
P-Ho:       0.0276 0.506 0.0227 0.576   0.299 0.0304 0.0727 0.451 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313   467 534 461 313 
                    
  C. Countries with data for all categories of earners, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.702*** 1.014*** 1.567*** 1.834***   1.100*** 1.415*** 2.016*** 2.096*** 
Newey-West SE (0.087) (0.106) (0.178) (0.307)   (0.157) (0.193) (0.312) (0.602) 
P-Ho:       0.000748 0.896 0.00161 0.00697   0.525 0.0324 0.00127 0.0701 
No. of Observations 328 328 312 274   328 328 312 274 
                    
  D. Countries with data for all categories of earners, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.766*** 1.044*** 1.523*** 1.208**   1.113*** 1.451*** 1.995*** 1.563** 
Newey-West SE (0.114) (0.131) (0.221) (0.545)   (0.134) (0.197) (0.338) (0.751) 
P-Ho:       0.0412 0.739 0.0185 0.702   0.400 0.0223 0.00350 0.454 
No. of Observations 328 328 312 274   328 328 312 274 
                    
  E. English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.755*** 1.283*** 2.122*** 2.853***   0.926*** 1.590*** 2.159*** 3.697*** 
Newey-West SE (0.080) (0.159) (0.372) (0.703)   (0.145) (0.295) (0.613) (1.109) 
P-Ho:       0.00287 0.0772 0.00314 0.0105   0.609 0.0469 0.0612 0.0178 
No. of Observations 161 161 119 65   161 161 119 65 
                    
  F. English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.735*** 1.222*** 1.153** 2.713***   0.763*** 1.666*** 1.006 3.657 
Newey-West SE (0.131) (0.214) (0.562) (0.975)   (0.202) (0.433) (0.977) (2.648) 
P-Ho:       0.0457 0.301 0.786 0.0842   0.243 0.126 0.995 0.320 
No. of Observations 161 161 119 65   161 161 119 65 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) with our one-period difference approach using different sets of 
observations in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least squares; IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West standard 




Table 10b. OLS and IV Estimates. One-period Difference 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS   IV 
                    
  G. Non-English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.805*** 1.050*** 1.436*** 1.477***   1.239*** 1.569*** 1.867*** 1.798*** 
Newey-West SE (0.086) (0.107) (0.174) (0.359)   (0.225) (0.286) (0.415) (0.580) 
P-Ho:       0.0250 0.638 0.0130 0.186   0.289 0.0475 0.0377 0.170 
No. of Observations 306 373 342 248   306 373 342 248 
                    
  H. Non-English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.831*** 1.033*** 1.369*** 0.917   1.323*** 1.607*** 1.730*** 0.958 
Newey-West SE (0.112) (0.141) (0.216) (0.602)   (0.270) (0.350) (0.518) (0.675) 
P-Ho:       0.132 0.813 0.0889 0.891   0.233 0.0836 0.160 0.950 
No. of Observations 306 373 342 248   306 373 342 248 
                    
  I. Excluding China, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.696*** 1.043*** 1.516*** 1.739***   1.031*** 1.430*** 1.803*** 2.141*** 
Newey-West SE (0.068) (0.096) (0.179) (0.323)   (0.153) (0.191) (0.362) (0.533) 
P-Ho:       1.13e-05 0.657 0.00412 0.0226   0.838 0.0251 0.0272 0.0329 
No. of Observations 451 518 445 313   451 518 445 313 
                    
  J. Excluding China, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.748*** 1.000*** 1.370*** 1.285**   1.033*** 1.414*** 1.552*** 1.507** 
Newey-West SE (0.085) (0.129) (0.238) (0.510)   (0.151) (0.207) (0.421) (0.672) 
P-Ho:       0.00316 0.999 0.121 0.576   0.825 0.0460 0.191 0.451 
No. of Observations 451 518 445 313   451 518 445 313 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) with our one-period difference approach using different sets of 
observations in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least squares; IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West standard 




Table 11. OLS and IV Estimates, in Differences. 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS 
          
  A. Observations separated by 5 years 
Log of GDP per capita 1.110*** 1.521*** 1.945*** 2.566*** 
Newey-West SE (0.148) (0.152) (0.258) (0.516) 
P-Ho:       0.458 0.000883 0.000448 0.00370 
No. of Observations 94 104 87 61 
          
  B. Observations separated by at least 5 years 
Log of GDP per capita 1.019*** 1.502*** 1.806*** 2.129*** 
Newey-West SE (0.110) (0.174) (0.328) (0.460) 
P-Ho:       0.865 0.00521 0.0168 0.0188 
No. of Observations 71 79 65 45 
          
  IV (alternative instrument) 
          
  C. Five-period difference 
Log of GDP per capita 1.120*** 1.649*** 2.003*** 2.777*** 
Newey-West SE (0.046) (0.093) (0.185) (0.336) 
P-Ho:       0.0104 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247 
          
Weak identification test (F statistic) 89.022 59.776 63.659 37.664 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.7569 0.079 0.0155 0.4869 
          
  D. One-period difference 
Log of GDP per capita 1.175*** 1.487*** 1.864*** 1.854** 
Newey-West SE (0.228) (0.282) (0.444) (0.763) 
P-Ho:       0.442 0.0850 0.0522 0.263 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313 
          
Weak identification test (F statistic) 39.206 41.572 68.703 30.885 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.1801 0.5345 0.9195 0.109 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) under different specifications. Panel A 
uses observations separated by five years. Panel B uses observations separated by at least five 
years. Panel C uses our alternative instrument for the five-period difference approach:  the annual 
log difference of GDP per capita seven periods before     and the level of GDP per capita eight 
periods before  . Panel D uses our alternative instrument for the one-period difference approach: 
the annual log difference of GDP per capita two periods before     and the level of GDP per 
capita three periods before    . OLS refers to ordinary least squares; IV refers to instrumental 




Table 12. OLS Estimates, in First Differences 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 10% Top 1% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Five-period difference 
Log of GDP per capita 0.989*** 1.040*** 1.373*** 1.498*** 1.836*** 1.896*** 2.575*** 2.544*** 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.048) (0.065) (0.091) (0.120) (0.159) (0.205) 
Share of gov. consumption   0.0222***   0.0209**   0.00210   0.00891 
    (0.0057)   (0.010)   (0.016)   (0.027) 
Openness as share of GDP   0.000200   -0.000581   -0.000199   0.00542** 
    (0.0003)   (0.0004)   (0.0009)   (0.002) 
Financial openness   -0.00992   -0.00611   0.0141   -0.0985*** 
    (0.006)   (0.011)   (0.019)   (0.021) 
Population growth   -0.00212   -0.00946   0.0353   0.0597 
    (0.005)   (0.008)   (0.027)   (0.042) 
Inflation   -6.70e-06   0.00473**   0.00646**   0.00354 
    (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.005) 
Log GDPpc * 1(log GDP pc <0) -0.363*** -0.306*** -0.271*** -0.221** -0.598*** -0.622*** -1.117*** -0.794*** 
  (0.0708) (0.0696) (0.104) (0.100) (0.185) (0.162) (0.107) (0.152) 
                  
P-Ho:       0.761 0.312 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P-Ho:                           0 0 0.353 0.021 0.229 0.162 0.005 0.001 
No. of Observations 385 382 434 431 362 359 250 247 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) with our five-period difference approach using all countries in our dataset. OLS refers to ordinary least 




Table A1. Available Annual Information per Country. Average Income of Top 10 Percent Earners 
Year Argentina Australia Canada China Colombia Denmark France Germany India Ireland Italy Japan Mauritius New 
Zealand 
Norway Portugal Singapore South 
Africa 




1980  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ 
1981  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1982  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1983  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1984  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1985  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1986  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1987  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1988  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1989  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1990  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1991  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1992  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1993  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1994  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1995  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1996  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1997  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1998  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1999  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2000  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2001  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2002  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2003  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2004  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2005  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2006  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2007  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2008  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2009  ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2010  ✓    ✓      ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
2011             ✓       ✓   ✓ 
Total 0 31 21 18 0 31 30 7 0 30 28 31 18 31 29 20 30 0 30 32 22 19 32 
Source:  WTI database. 
Note:  This table shows which years in our dataset have available information on average income of top 10 percent earners per country in the period 1980-2011.  
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 Table A2. Available Annual Information per Country. Average Income of Top 1 Percent Earners 
Year Argentina Australia Canada China Colombia Denmark France Germany India Ireland Italy Japan Mauritius New  
Zealand 




1980  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ 
1981  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1982  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1983  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1984  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1985  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1986  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1987  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1988  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1989  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1990  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1991  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1992  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1993  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1994  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1995  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1996  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1997 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1998 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1999 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2000 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2001 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2002 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2003 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2004 ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2005  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2006  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2007  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2008  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2009  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2010  ✓   ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2011             ✓       ✓   ✓ 
Total 8 31 21 18 18 31 30 7 20 30 28 31 28 31 29 20 30 13 30 32 22 19 32 
Source:  WTI database. 
Note:  This table shows which years in our dataset have available information on average income of top 1 percent earners per country in the period 1980-2011.  
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Table A3. Available Annual Information per Country. Average Income of Top 0.1 Percent Earners 
Year Argentina Australia Canada China Colombia Denmark France Germany India Ireland Italy Japan Mauritius New  
Zealand 




1980  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ 
1981  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1982  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1983  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1984  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1985  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1986  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1987  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1988  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1989  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1990  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1991  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1992  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1993  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1994  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
1995  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1996  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1997 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1998 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1999 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2000 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2001 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2002 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2003 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2004 ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2005  ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2006  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2007  ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2008  ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2009  ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2010  ✓   ✓ ✓      ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
2011                    ✓   ✓ 
Total 8 31 21 17 16 31 27 7 20 11 28 31 18 10 29 20 17 9 30 32 22 16 32 
Source:  WTI database. 
Note:  This table shows which years in our dataset have available information on average income of top 0.1 percent earners per country in the period 1980-2011.  
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Table A4. Available Annual Information per Country. Average Income of Top 0.01 Percent Earners 
Year Argentina Australia Canada China Colombia Denmark France Germany India Ireland Italy Japan Mauritius New Zealand Norway Portugal Singapore South  
Africa 




1980   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓        ✓   ✓ 
1981   ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1982   ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1983   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1984   ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1985  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1986  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1987  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1988  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1989  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1990  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1991  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1992  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1993  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1994  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ 
1995  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1996  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1997 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1998 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
1999 ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2000 ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2001 ✓     ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2002 ✓     ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2003 ✓     ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2004 ✓     ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2005      ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2006     ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2007     ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2008     ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2009     ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
2010     ✓ ✓      ✓      ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
2011                    ✓   ✓ 
Total 8 14 21 0 5 31 27 7 20 0 28 31 0 0 0 17 3 9 30 32 22 0 32 
Source:  WTI database. 




Table A5a. IV Estimates (Alternative Set of Instruments). Five-period Difference 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV 
          
  A. All countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.038*** 1.427*** 1.867*** 2.630*** 
Newey-West SE (0.0413) (0.0583) (0.107) (0.177) 
P-Ho:       0.362 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 385 434 362 250 
          
  B. All countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.120*** 1.649*** 2.003*** 2.777*** 
Newey-West SE (0.046) (0.093) (0.185) (0.336) 
P-Ho:       0.0104 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 382 431 359 247 
          
  
C. Countries with data for all categories of earners, not including 
controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.026*** 1.415*** 1.987*** 2.457*** 
Newey-West SE (0.072) (0.085) (0.122) (0.174) 
P-Ho:       0.723 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 273 273 258 228 
          
  
D. Countries with data for all categories of earners, including 
controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.007*** 1.564*** 2.412*** 2.637*** 
Newey-West SE (0.066) (0.121) (0.204) (0.333) 
P-Ho:       0.919  0  
No. of Observations 270 270 255 225 
          
  E. English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.896*** 1.537*** 2.347*** 3.295*** 
Newey-West SE (0.052) (0.096) (0.205) (0.319) 
P-Ho:       0.0480 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 132 132 90 53 
          
  F. English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.980*** 2.249*** 1.759*** 3.711*** 
Newey-West SE (0.126) (0.265) (0.406) (0.574) 
P-Ho:       0.871 0 0.0651 0 
No. of Observations 132 132 90 53 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) under our five-period difference approach using different 
sets of observations in our dataset, and our alternative set of instruments. We instrument the annual log difference 
of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log difference of GDP per capita seven periods before 
    and the level of GDP per capita eight periods before  . IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West 




Table A5b. IV Estimates (Alternative Set of Instruments). Five-period Difference 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV 
          
  G. Non-English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.094*** 1.381*** 1.763*** 2.493*** 
Newey-West SE (0.052) (0.071) (0.119) (0.205) 
P-Ho:       0.0730 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 253 302 272 197 
          
  H. Non-English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.128*** 1.495*** 1.884*** 2.571*** 
Newey-West SE (0.055) (0.104) (0.203) (0.423) 
P-Ho:       0.0228 0 0 0.000268 
No. of Observations 250 299 269 194 
          
  I. Excluding China, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.999*** 1.460*** 2.080*** 2.630*** 
Newey-West SE (0.052) (0.068) (0.120) (0.177) 
P-Ho:       0.981 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 373 422 350 250 
          
  J. Excluding China, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.050*** 1.774*** 2.480*** 2.777*** 
Newey-West SE (0.063) (0.110) (0.206) (0.336) 
P-Ho:       0.435 0 0 0 
No. of Observations 370 419 347 247 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) under our five-period difference approach using different 
sets of observations in our dataset, and our alternative set of instruments. We instrument the annual log difference 
of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log difference of GDP per capita seven periods before 
    and the level of GDP per capita eight periods before  . IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West 




Table A6a. IV Estimates (Alternative Set of Instruments). One-period Difference 
 Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV  
          
  A. All countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.126*** 1.469*** 1.968*** 2.612*** 
Newey-West SE (0.210) (0.242) (0.361) (0.582) 
P-Ho:       0.551 0.0529 0.00767 0.00596 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313 
          
  B. All countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.175*** 1.487*** 1.864*** 1.854** 
Newey-West SE (0.228) (0.282) (0.444) (0.763) 
P-Ho:       0.442 0.0850 0.0522 0.263 
No. of Observations 467 534 461 313 
          
  
C. Countries with data for all categories of earners, not including 
controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.238*** 1.550*** 2.145*** 2.583*** 
Newey-West SE (0.335) (0.356) (0.440) (0.640) 
P-Ho:       0.477 0.123 0.00977 0.0139 
No. of Observations 328 328 312 274 
          
  
D. Countries with data for all categories of earners, including 
controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.280*** 1.581*** 2.122*** 1.949** 
Newey-West SE (0.330) (0.363) (0.468) (0.770) 
P-Ho:       0.396 0.110 0.0171 0.219 
No. of Observations 328 328 312 274 
          
  E. English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.876*** 1.434*** 2.114*** 3.630*** 
Newey-West SE (0.150) (0.340) (0.657) (1.252) 
P-Ho:       0.411 0.204 0.0923 0.0396 
No. of Observations 161 161 119 65 
          
  F. English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 0.657*** 1.259** 0.725 3.886 
Newey-West SE (0.241) (0.564) (1.102) (2.922) 
P-Ho:       0.156 0.647 0.803 0.327 
No. of Observations 161 161 119 65 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) under our one-period difference approach using different 
sets of observations in our dataset, and our alternative set of instruments. We instrument the annual log difference 
of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log difference of GDP per capita two periods before     
and the level of GDP per capita three periods before      IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West 




Table A6b. IV Estimates (alternative set of instruments). One-period difference 
  Average income of: Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV  
          
  G. Non-English-speaking countries, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.239*** 1.480*** 1.925*** 2.339*** 
Newey-West SE (0.301) (0.310) (0.427) (0.653) 
P-Ho:       0.429 0.122 0.0310 0.0413 
No. of Observations 306 373 342 248 
          
  H. Non-English-speaking countries, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.301*** 1.489*** 1.808*** 1.161 
Newey-West SE (0.312) (0.342) (0.507) (0.774) 
P-Ho:       0.335 0.153 0.112 0.836 
No. of Observations 306 373 342 248 
          
  I. Excluding China, not including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.108*** 1.458*** 2.029*** 2.612*** 
Newey-West SE (0.234) (0.265) (0.403) (0.582) 
P-Ho:       0.645 0.0841 0.0109 0.00596 
No. of Observations 451 518 445 313 
          
  J. Excluding China, including controls 
Log of GDP per capita 1.124*** 1.441*** 1.932*** 1.854** 
Newey-West SE (0.246) (0.298) (0.484) (0.763) 
P-Ho:       0.616 0.140 0.0548 0.263 
No. of Observations 451 518 445 313 
Note:  This table shows results of estimating equation (2) under our one-period difference approach using different 
sets of observations in our dataset, and our alternative set of instruments. We instrument the annual log difference 
of GDP per capita between   and     with the annual log difference of GDP per capita two periods before     
and the level of GDP per capita three periods before      IV refers to instrumental variables. Newey-West 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
